**THE NINE PRINCIPLES USED IN THE KOREAN WAR**

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**Introduction**

**How can you describe the nine principles of war when it comes to the Korean war**

The nine principles of war are essentials for the planning at the strategic, operational and tactical levels of war.

The Korean war was fought between the North Korea and South Korea from 1950 to 1953. The war had different allies who backed up different countries i.e North Korea was supported by China and the Soviet Union while South Korea was supported by the United States and allied countries. Therefore, this case is intended provide a general overview of the conflict in reference to the nine principles of war and how they were applied.

The commonly known principles of war are; objectives, offensive, mass, security, economy of force, manoeuvre, unity of command, surprise and simplicity.

1. **Objectives**

Objectives are the ultimate purpose of war, to destroy the enemy’s ability and the will to fight by directing every military operation towards a clearly defined, decisive and attained end.

The civilians who directed the Truman administration’s foreign policy formulated the “pragmatic doctrine” (Janowitz, 1960). Which emphasized alliances and limited war for political objectives. Nevertheless, civilian policy makers during the Korean War supported some of the “absolutist” positions of General MacArthur. These included rolling back Communism in Korea, seeking a decisive military victory, ignoring allies’ calls for restraint, and valuing displays of military strength. This article utilizes recently declassified government documents to argue that civilian policy makers favoured and directly approved MacArthur’s offensive to the Chinese border, which brought on a Chinese counterattack, with disastrous results for the U.N. forces. The evidence does not support the standard interpretation that attributes the offensive to MacArthur’s insubordination and a breakdown of civilian control of the military.

Also in October 1950, one year after the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Mao Zedong and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership sent” Chinese People’s Volunteers” to Korea to fight United Nations forces moving rapidly toward the Chinese Korean border. China’s intervention saved Kim II Sung’s North Korean Communist regime from imminent collapse but failed to overwhelm the UN forces. The Korean War ended in July 1953 with Korea’s political map virtually unchanged compared to the pre-war situation. As far as its impact on Sino-American relations is concerned, China’s rushing into a military conflict with the United States finally buried any hope for a CCP-American accommodation, and the Cold War in Asia entered a new stage characterized by a total confrontation between the PRC and the United States, which lasted until the early 1970s.

1. **Offensive**

Offensive principle is always applied to seize, retain and exploit the initiative and it’s always effective and decisive in a way that it attains a clearly defined common objective while maintaining freedom of action and achieving decisive results.

After the first two months of war, the South Korean army (ROKA) and hastily dispatched American forces were on the point of defeat, retreating to a small area behind a defensive line known as the Pusan Perimeter. In September 1950, a risky amphibious UN counteroffensive was launched at Incheon, cutting off KPA troops and supply lines in South Korea. Those who escaped envelopment and capture were forced back north. UN forces then invaded North Korea in October 1950 and moved rapidly towards the Yalu River, the border with China, but on 19 October 1950, Chinese forces - the People's Volunteer Army (PVA) - crossed the Yalu and entered the war. The UN retreated from North Korea following the PVA's First Phase Offensive and the Second Phase Offensive. China along with their North Korean and Soviet allies pressed their offensive, invading the South and capturing Seoul by early January of 1951. A UN force recaptured the city from them, and the communist forces were pushed back to positions around the 38th parallel following PVA's abortive Fifth Phase Offensive. After this, the front which was close to where the war had started stabilized, and the last two years were a war of attrition.

1. **Mass**

This is always done by synchronising the effects by overwhelming combat power rather than concentrating forces at the decisive places which results in limiting the exposure to the enemy fire.

The Korean People’s Army (KPA) had a combined arms force including tanks supported by heavy artillery. The Republic of Korea(ROK) had no tanks, anti-tank weapons or heavy artillery to stop such an attack. In addition, the South Koreans committed their forces in a piecemeal fashion, and these were routed in a few days.

The defensive artillery fire support used by large-unit commanders during the Korean War Operational success in the Korean War largely depended on the United Nations ability to provide adequate artillery fire support against the massive North Korean and Chinese forces. During the course of the conflict, what emerged were principles that contributed to the operational employment of artillery. The fundamental principles of defensive artillery fire support as employed by large unit commanders in the Korean War were mass, unity of command and security.

1. **Economy of force**

This is quite opposite to Mass principle as it is more of a realisation that one must employ all combat power in the most effective way and judicious way possible.

Meanwhile, during the war, counterinsurgency efforts in the South Korean interior intensified; persistent operations, paired with worsening weather conditions, eventually denied the guerrillas sanctuary and wore away their fighting strength. North Korea responded by sending more troops to link up with existing insurgents and build more partisan cadres; the number of North Korean infiltrators had reached 3,000 soldiers in 12 units by the start of 1950, but all of these units were destroyed or scattered by the ROKA. On 1 October 1949, the ROKA launched a three-pronged assault on the insurgents in South Cholla and Taegu. By March 1950, the ROKA claimed 5,621 guerrillas killed or captured and 1,066 small arms seized. This operation crippled the insurgency. Soon after, the North Koreans made two final attempts to keep the uprising active, sending two battalion-sized units of infiltrators under the commands of Kim Sang-ho and Kim Moo-hyon. The first battalion was reduced in annihilation to a single man over the course of several engagements by the Republic of Korea Army (ROKA) 8th Division. The second battalion was annihilated by a two-battalion hammer-and-anvil manoeuvre by units of the ROKA 6th Division, resulting in a loss toll of 584 KPA guerrillas (480 killed, 104 captured) and 69 ROKA troops killed, plus 184 wounded. By spring of 1950, guerrilla activity had mostly subsided; the border, too, was calm.

1. **Manoeuvre**

Manoeuvre is that deliberate movement of forces in relation to the enemy to gain an advantage.

In the Korean War it was used to exploit the success of the enemy and preserve it for the freedom action. The Koreans focused on the core of the war and invest(manoeuvre) to new inhibited areas.

The availability of sanctuary to an enemy can often limit the ability of friendly forces to achieve tactical success in military operations. Prior to the advent of airpower, combatants could often attain sanctuary, or safe haven, simply because one enemy could not physically employ significant military force into an area used by the other.

The Korean War provides an excellent example of political restraints creating an enemy sanctuary. Joint Publication 5-0 cites the restrictions placed on General MacArthur’s authority to strike Chinese targets north of the Yalu River during the Korean War as an example of an operational limitation.

US military commanders in Korea were politically restrained from conducting operations north of the Yalu River, which limited their ability to achieve their tactical objectives against North Korean and Chinese forces. The political restraints on US military operations in Korea were designed to mitigate the risk of escalating conflict in Korea and thereby avoiding war with the Soviet Union in Western Europe.

1. **Unity of command**

For every objective one must seek the unity of command and the unity of effort as it was witnessed in the Korean war.

After failed attempts to stop the fighting and unify the Koreas, North Korean forces (Korean People's Army or KPA) crossed the 38th parallel on 25 June 1950, formally starting the war. The United Nations Security Council denounced North Korea's actions and authorized the formation of the United Nations Command and the dispatch of forces to Korea to repel it. The Soviet Union was boycotting the UN for recognizing Taiwan (Republic of China) as China. and the People's Republic of China was not recognized by the UN, so neither could support their ally North Korea at the Security Council meeting. Twenty-one countries of the United Nations eventually contributed to the UN force, with the United States providing around 90% of the military personnel and represented the first attempt at collective security under the United Nations system.

1. **Security**

Security becomes very essential as it can never permit the enemy to acquire the unexpected advantaged.

On 16 September Eighth Army began its breakout from the Pusan Perimeter. Task Force Lynch, 3rd Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment, and two 70th Tank Battalion units (Charlie Company and the Intelligence–Reconnaissance Platoon) advanced through 171.2 km (106.4 mi) of KPA territory to join the 7th Infantry Division at Osan on 27 September. X Corps rapidly defeated the KPA defenders around Seoul, thus threatening to trap the main KPA force in southern Korea. Thus, strengthening their security

Kinds of Weapons Perhaps the most dramatic and the most frequently discussed limit in the Korean War was the abstention by both sides from the use of atomic capabilities. It should be recalled that these capabilities were substantially smaller than they are now. Both sides had only fission weapons (and no fusion bombs), and both (but particularly the Soviets) had very small stockpiles. Nevertheless, these weapons were potentially decisive, particularly if they had been used in a geographical area more extensive than the Korean peninsula. The failure to use nuclear weapons was the only major weapons limit observed by the United Nations forces. On the other hand, the Communist troops not only failed to use nuclear weapons, but also did not employ submarines.

Participation of States Only the North Koreans and South Koreans participated in the war with all their available forces. The Communist Chinese sent in a large number of troops, but, as Peiping continually stressed, all of them entered the war as" volunteers," for Peiping never declared war.

1. **Surprise**

Clearly military surprise is among the greatest dangers a country can face. Despite a knowledge of this danger, responsible leaders have failed to prevent surprise at the start of most wars. To help explain this apparent contradiction and to suggest explanations why surprise occurs, a general theory of surprise is developed.

 On 18 September, Stalin dispatched General H. M. Zakharov to North Korea to advise Kim to halt his offensive around the Pusan Perimeter and to redeploy his forces to defend Seoul. Chinese commanders were not briefed on North Korean troop numbers or operational plans. As the overall commander of Chinese forces, Zhou suggested that the North Koreans should attempt to eliminate the UN forces at Incheon only if they had reserves of at least 100,000 men; otherwise, he advised the North Koreans to withdraw their forces north.

On 25 September, Seoul was recaptured by UN forces. U.S. air raids caused heavy damage to the KPA, destroying most of its tanks and much of its artillery. KPA troops in the south, instead of effectively withdrawing north, rapidly disintegrated, leaving Pyongyang vulnerable. During the general retreat, only 25,000 to 30,000 KPA soldiers managed to reach the KPA lines. On 27 September, Stalin convened an emergency session of the Politburo, in which he condemned the incompetence of the KPA command and held Soviet military advisers responsible for the defeat.

1. **Simplicity**

This entails clear preparation, uncomplicated plans and concise orders to ensure the understanding of a certain group. A good simple plan with concise clear words minimises the chances of Confusion. Complication is an unfortunate by-product of the search for Advantage.

On 29 November 1952 U.S. President-Elect Dwight D. Eisenhower went to Korea to learn what might end the Korean War.

The new Soviet leaders, engaged in their internal power struggle, had no desire to continue supporting China’s efforts in Korea and issued a statement calling for an end to the hostilities. China could not continue the war without Soviet aid, and North Korea was no longer a major player. Armistice talks entered a new phase. With the United Nations’ acceptance of India’s proposed Korean War armistice, the Korean People’s Army (KPA), the People’s Volunteer Army(PVA) and the United Nations Command signed the armistice agreement on 27 July 1953. South Korean president Syngman Rhee refused to sign the agreement. The war is considered to have ended at this point, even though there was no peace treaty. North Korea nevertheless claims that it won the Korean War.

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