**The Nine Principles Of War Used In The Korean War**

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 Course

 Due Date:

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The nine principles of war are essential for planning at the strategic, operational and tactical levels of war. The commonly known principles of war are; objectives, offensive, mass, security, economy of force, manoeuvre, unity of command, surprise and simplicity.

The war between the North Korea and South Korea occured between the year of 1950 to 1953 with different allies from China and the Soviet Union supporting North Korea while the South Korea got their support from the United states of America. Therefore this case is intended to provide a general overview of the conflict about the nine principles of war and how they were applied.

Objectives are the ultimate purpose of war, to destroy the enemy’s ability and the will to fight by directing every military operation towards a clearly defined, decisive and attained end. According to ( Janowitz, 1990). ‘pragmatic doctrine’ was formulated by the civilians who directed Truman administration of foreign policies. Which emphasized alliances and limited war for political objectives. Nevertheless, civilian policymakers during the Korean War supported some of the “absolutist” positions of General MacArthur whereby it included the rolling back communism in Korea and displaying of millitary strengths among others. This article utilizes recently declassified government documents to argue that civilian policymakers favoured and directly approved MacArthur’s offensive to the Chinese border, which brought on a Chinese counterattack, with disastrous results for the U.N. forces. The evidence does not support the standard interpretation that attributes the offensive to MacArthur’s insubordination and a breakdown of civilian control of the military. Also in October 1950, one year after the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Mao Zedong and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership sent” Chinese People’s Volunteers” to Korea to fight United Nations forces moving rapidly toward the Chinese Korean border. China’s intervention saved Kim II Sung’s North Korean Communist regime from imminent collapse but failed to overwhelm the UN forces. The Korean War ended in July 1953 with Korea’s political map virtually unchanged compared to the pre-war situation. As far as its impact on Sino-American relations is concerned, China’s rushing into a military conflict with the United States finally buried any hope for a CCP-American accommodation, and the Cold War in Asia entered a new stage characterized by a total confrontation between the PRC and the United States, which lasted until the early 1970s.

The offensive principle is always applied to seize, retain and exploit the initiative and it’s always effective and decisive in a way that it attains a clearly defined common objective while maintaining freedom of action and achieving decisive results. After the first two months of the war, the South Korean army (ROKA) and hastily dispatched American forces were on the point of defeat, retreating to a small area behind a defensive line known as the Pusan Perimeter.

The Mass principle is always done by synchronising the effects by overwhelming combat power rather than concentrating forces at the decisive places which results in limiting the exposure to the enemy fire. The Korean People’s Army (KPA) had a combined arms force including tanks supported by heavy artillery. The Republic of Korea(ROK) had no tanks, anti-tank weapons or heavy artillery to stop such an attack. The defensive artillery fire support used by large-unit commanders during the Korean War Operational success in the Korean War largely depended on the United Nation’s ability to provide adequate artillery fire support against the massive North Korean and Chinese forces. During the conflict, what emerged were principles that contributed to the operational employment of artillery.

The economy of force principle is quite opposite to the Mass principle as it is more of a realisation that one must employ all combat power most effectively and judiciously as possible. Meanwhile, during the war, counterinsurgency efforts in the South Korean interior intensified; persistent operations, paired with worsening weather conditions, eventually denied the guerrillas sanctuary and wore away their fighting strength. The North Koreans then deployed more troops to join their existing troops who by then had reduced in order to build up their numbers. By 1950, the North Korea infiltrators were scattered by the ROKA thus making their operation weakened their uprising. The first battalion was reduced in annihilation to a single man throughout several engagements by the Republic of Korea Army (ROKA) 8th Division. The second battalion recieved a great loss of their casualties and more deaths of their soldiers. By the spring of 1950, guerrilla activity had mostly subsided; the border, too, was calm.

Manoeuvre is the deliberate movement of forces against the enemy to gain an advantage. In the Korean War, it was used to exploit the success of the enemy and preserve it for freedom action. The Koreans focused on the core of the war and invested (manoeuvre) in newly inhabited areas. Before the advent of airpower, combatants could often attain sanctuary, or haven, simply because one enemy could not physically employ significant military force into an area used by the other. The political restraints on US military operations in Korea were designed to mitigate the risk of escalating conflict in Korea and thereby avoid war with the Soviet Union in Western Europe.

 In the unity of command; in every objective one must seek the unity of command and the unity of effort as was witnessed in the Korean War. After failed attempts to stop the fighting and unify the Koreas, North Korean forces (Korean People’s Army or KPA) crossed the 38th parallel on 25 June 1950, formally starting the war. The United Nations Security Council denounced North Korea’s actions and authorized the formation of the United Nations Command and the dispatch of forces to Korea to repel it. Twenty-one countries of the United Nations eventually contributed to the UN force, with the United States providing around 90% of the military personnel and representing the first attempt at collective security under the United Nations system.

Security becomes essential as it can never permit the enemy to acquire an unexpected advantage. Thus strengthening their security. Kinds of Weapons Perhaps the most dramatic and the most frequently discussed limit in the Korean War was the abstention by both sides from the use of atomic capabilities. It should be recalled that these capabilities were substantially smaller than they are now. Both sides had only fission weapons (and no fusion bombs), and both (but particularly the Soviets) had very small stockpiles. Nevertheless, these weapons were potentially decisive, particularly if they had been used in a geographical area more extensive than the Korean peninsula. The failure to use nuclear weapons was the only major weapons limit observed by the United Nations forces. On the other hand, the Communist troops not only failed to use nuclear weapons but also did not employ submarines. Participation of States Only the North Koreans and South Koreans participated in the war with all their available forces.

 Despite knowledge of this danger, responsible leaders have failed to prevent surprise at the start of most wars. To help explain this apparent contradiction and to suggest explanations for why surprise occurs, a general theory of surprise is developed. General H. M. Zakharov was then sent to North Korea by Stalin to advise Kim to halt his offensive around the Pusan Perimeter and to redeploy his forces to defend Seoul. At that time, the Chinese commanders were not told on the North Korea operational plans.

 Simplicity entails clear preparation, uncomplicated plans and concise orders to ensure the understanding of a certain group. A good simple plan with concise clear words minimises the chances of Confusion. Complication is an unfortunate by-product of the search for Advantage. In 1952, the U.S President Elect Eisenhower visited Korea with an aim on finding solution to put an end to the war. And that time the Soviet Union leaders had an internal power struggle which led to then boycotting their support to the North Korea. With the United Nations’ acceptance of India’s proposed Korean War armistice, the Korean People’s Army(KPA), the People’s Volunteer Army(PVA) and the United Nations Command signed the armistice agreement on 27 July 1953.

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